ABSTRACT As modern systems become increasingly complex, current security practices lack effective methodologies to adequately address the system security. This paper proposes a repeatable and tailorable framework to assist in the application of systems security engineering (SSE) processes, activities, and tasks as defined in the recently released National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication 800-160. First, a brief survey of systems-oriented security methodologies is provided. Next, an examination of the relationships between the NIST-defined SSE processes is conducted to provide context for the engineering problem space. These findings inform a mapping of the NIST SSE processes to seven system-agnostic security domains which enable prioritization for three types of systems (conventional IT, cyber-physical, and defense). These concrete examples provide further understanding for applying and prioritizing the SSE effort. The goal of this paper is assist practitioners by informing the efficient application of the 30 processes, 111 activities, and 428 tasks defined in NIST SP 800-160. The customizable framework tool is available online for developers to employ, modify, and tailor to meet their needs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Current security practices lack effective methodologies to prioritize and address system security efforts in complex systems [1] , [27] . For example, in their recent call to arms, the Principal Deputy to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Engineering Kristen Baldwin et al. specifically cite that one of the major challenges to modern programs and systems is the increasingly complex, dynamic, and interconnected interactions of systems [3] . They stress the need for integration and formalization of security methods, processes, and tools into established Systems Engineering processes. However, this is a non-trivial problem as our ability to understand and prove that complex systems and Systems-of-Systems (SoS) are secure is constantly challenged.
To address this problem, the National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication (NIST SP) 800-160 Systems Security Engineering was published with the goal of assisting system developers in engineering trustworthy secure systems that are capable of supporting critical missions and business operations while meeting stakeholder security objectives and protection needs [1] . For an overview of NIST SP 800-160, please see [6] , [7] .
This article seeks to provide a customizable System Security Engineering (SSE) framework 1,2 that offers a repeatable and tailorable methodology for system developers to efficiently meet stakeholder protection needs and concerns. More specifically, this work assesses the applicability of NIST SP 800-160's 30 SSE processes, 111 activities, and 428 tasks with the goal of efficiently allocating limited SSE resources [39] . By doing so, we make the following contributions:
• Analysis of the relationships between the 30 SSE processes as defined in NIST SP 800-160
• Mapping of the SSE processes and activities to a standardized, repeatable approach 1 This notion of an SSE Framework is distinctly different from the notional SSE Framework provided in the NIST SP 800-160, which provides focus on distinguishing problem, solution, and trustworthiness context. 2 The framework is fully customizable such that it can be downloaded and modified in accordance with the user's desires and expectations.
• Systematic consideration of the SSE processes and activities to three system types (conventional IT, cyberphysical, and defense) which promotes understanding and enables tailoring of the SSE effort In Section II, a discussion of existing SSE concepts, methodologies, and frameworks is provided for the reader. Section III explores the SSE process relationships through graphical analysis clustering. This application identifies and outlines the explicit relationships between processes and activities presented in the NIST SP 800-160. Section IV introduces the SSE application framework by discussing domain-to-process associations and mappings. Section V provides a brief commentary on the implications of these domain mappings and the ability to express particular areas of interest in the NIST SP 800-160 for the Systems Engineer given their own specific domain prioritization. It also provides three examples which utilize the framework presented in Sections III and IV to prioritize SSE efforts. Finally, in Section VI, we conclude with a discussion on the interpretations of our work and discuss how this research agenda can be further explored with respect to the NIST SP 800-160. This work also seeks to extend the baseline knowledge of practicing Systems Security Engineers and those responsible for executing SSE roles and responsibilities [5] . Note, this work extends the author's previous work [2] , [6] , [7] .
II. BACKGROUND
Despite their focus on computer security, early works recognized the foundational systems nature of their task [6] . For example, the 1970 Defense Science Board Task Force on Computer Security concluded that providing satisfactory security controls in a computer system is itself a system design problem [31] . Moreover, the board specifically identified security as a systems problem: ''a combination of hardware, software, communications, physical, personnel, policy, and procedural safeguards'' [31] .
As modern systems continue to increase in size and complexity, systems security is not adequately addressed, resulting in business and mission stakeholders becoming more susceptible to a considerable array of disruptive events [1] . This is because the majority of security literature speaks to security only from an IT or cybersecurity perspective, (e.g., Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) [8] , Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) [9] , Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria (CTCPEC) [10] , and ISO/IEC 15408: Information technology -Security techniques -Evaluation criteria for IT security [11] ).
Initially sponsored by the National Security Agency (NSA) and developed by the International Systems Security Engineering Association (ISSEA), the Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM), which has evolved into ISO/IEC 21827, describes essential characteristics of engineering security processes that should exist in an organization in order to ensure quality security engineering [32] , [34] . The SSE-CMM establishes a framework for measuring and improving performance in the application of security engineering principles. It can be used by organizations to evaluate and refine security engineering practices, customers to evaluate a provider's security engineering capability, and assessors to establish organizational capability-based confidences [33] , [34] .
While the SSE-CMM delivers the necessary roadmap for adopting organization-wide security engineering practices, it does not specifically point out any tools or techniques that can be used to help reach the goals described in the process areas; rather, it is used as a means for engineering organizations to evaluate their security engineering practices and define improvements to them [33] , [34] .
Another groundbreaking work, Ross Anderson's Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems describes the interaction between technical engineering basics, security, human psychology, and usability [21] . At more than one thousand pages, this comprehensive volume details how to develop systems that stay dependable whether faced with error or malice. As security spans a wide gamut of disciplines, this book tries to bridge the gap between the various disciplines while avoiding unnecessary technical details and providing much emphasis on what can go wrong and what one can learn from those situations. While it does not specifically present a ''systems-oriented'' view of security, it highlights numerous security considerations for a number of distributed systems and successfully covers a wide range of practical security issues quite well.
In addition, a risk-based methodology for addressing security specific concerns in US Department of Defense (DoD) systems was defined in the Program Protection Plan (PPP) [3] , which serves as the basis for DoD SSE efforts. The PPP is primarily targeted to the problems of protection of combatant advantage and issues of malicious insertion. In 2011, the DoD publicly acknowledged the need for an integrated approach for developing secure systems as they revitalized their SSE approach through the PPP [3] , [25] . By identifying critical system components and assessing threats and vulnerabilities of these components, the Systems Engineer can identify and address countermeasure options for the system. By considering these risks in early concepts, requirements, and design trades for systems, SSE is being formally integrated into existing systems engineering approaches for complex system development [3] , [35] .
Other security frameworks, such as those used to develop the seven abstracted security domains described in [2] [14] ; the International Information System Security Certification Consortium (ISC) 2 CISSP CBK [15] ; the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan, an annex to their National Infrastructure Protection Plan [16] ; and the DHS Catalog of Control Systems Security for protecting critical infrastructure [17] . These works outline VOLUME 5, 2017 provisions for establishing minimum baseline or system-level security considerations for their respective areas.
While there are many excellent security frameworks and methodologies available, there are few references written to equip the Systems Engineer to intelligently engage the established security community. Of the SSE literature available, only a few promote a systematic approach to SSE. Furthermore, due to the constant emergence of new threats and technologies, adopting organization-wide standardization of security concepts and practices is becoming more critical.
Of noteworthy importance is NIST SP 800-160, which provides a systematic approach to security for Systems Engineers and is framed around the widely accepted international standard ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 [4] . Published in November of 2016, after 5 years of effort and significant reviews by subject matter experts, it is arguably the most comprehensive statement on SSE to date, providing foundational engineering considerations in the form of SSE processes, activities, and tasks based on well-established security principles, concepts, and practices. More concretely, NIST SP 800-160 is not a standard, prescriptive checklist, or formalized evaluation criteria; it is a multidisciplinary engineering approach which ''ensures [security] requirements and needs are addressed with appropriate fidelity and rigor'' [4] .
III. INHERENT RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN SSE PROCESSES
In this section, we study and map relationships between the 30 SSE processes as described in the NIST SP 800-160. While each process and its supporting activities and tasks can be executed as a standalone procedure, it is often the case that each process (or one of its activities) is in relationship with other processes. For example, the NIST SP 800-160 explicitly connects several of these processes and activities to other processes and activities, either as inputs or outcomes of those processes and activities.
Graphing these relationships, Fig. 1 visually depicts the relational dependencies between the various NIST SP 800-160 SSE processes (note, we assume non-directional interactions of the explicitly stated connections) [30] . A detailed mapping of these relationships is provided in Table 10 . Immediately, we see that no single process is independently executed; each process outcome influences or is influenced by one or more other processes which may not even be in the same process family.
In analyzing these relationships, we use clustering coefficients as shown in Table 1 . In graph theory, the clustering coefficient is a measure of the degree to which nodes in a graph tend to cluster together (i.e., similar to cohesion). It is a real number between 0 and 1 in which 0 represents no clustering and 1 represents maximal clustering [38] . Evidence suggests that in most real-world networks, and in particular social networks, nodes tend to create tightly coupled groups characterized by a relatively high density of ties where this likelihood tends to be greater than the average probability of a randomly established tie between two nodes [36] , [37] .
Specifically, the clustering coefficient of a graph is based on a local clustering coefficient for each node C i = number of triangles connected to node i number of triples centered around node i
where a triple centered around node i is a set of two edges connected to node i. Treating each process as a node (i.e., see Fig. 1 ), the clustering coefficients are shown in Table 1 . These results point to the notion that 27 of the 30 processes have some degree of connectedness (i.e., a relationship) with the other processes. In other words, when applying any one of the SSE processes to a system of interest, the developer should account for possible related processes in order to maximize the development effort (e.g., 20 of the processes have a clustering coefficient of 0.5 or higher, meaning they are in close relationship with other processes). While those familiar with the ISO/IEC/IEEE 15288 expect the processes to be related, the level of connectiveness (or lack thereof) is perhaps surprising. For example, the clustering coefficient for Measurement, Human Resource Management, and Knowledge Management is 0, a ''relationship value'' which corresponds to the number of connections each process makes to other processes. While a value of 0 does not necessarily mean there are no connections to a node, it can be interpreted as a less complete neighborhood around that particular node. These results provide detailed insight into the problem space for the developer attempting to effectively apply the SSE processes. While the tools and expertise that enable Systems Security Engineers to obtain information about security incidents exist (e.g., attack path analysis, vulnerability analysis, historical examples of adversarial behavior, etc.), information about potential risks to systems of interest is not readily available [29] . Thus, some SSE prioritization can be performed, but it is largely a manual process with significant reliance upon the human decision-maker which requires expert domain knowledge and substantial time [29] . The proposed framework attempts to ease this burden by providing a standardized framework for prioritization that complements decision-makers and Subject Matter Experts (SMEs).
IV. DOMAIN-TO-PROCESS ASSOCIATIONS
To study the efficient application of the SSE processes, we utilize the seven abstracted system security domains from [2] (i.e., Compliance, People, System Resiliency, Operations, Physical and Environmental, Asset Management, and Interconnectivity). These system-agnostic domains allow Systems Security Engineers to reasonably partition their security considerations using well-established security frameworks across many fields and specialty areas without being too restrictive to any one specific type of system [2] .
Utilizing past and present experiences, systems-related works such as [3] and [4] , and security-related works including [5] - [7] , we interpret the NIST SP 800-160 SSE processes and map each of the 111 activities to the systems security domains (for full details please see Table 11 ). While the domains could be mapped to the higher level processes or the lower level tasks, we decided to perform the mapping at the activities level because the processes themselves do not provide enough specificity for detailed associations whereas the tasks are perhaps too detailed for our purposes. It is also important to note that these domains and their prioritizations are inherently subjective in value, definition, and relevance (which is another reason the mapping framework tool is made available online for evaluation).
The results of Table 11 are normalized on a scale from 0 to 1, with 0 having no relation and 1 being a strong relation between the domain and the process in question. More simply, the more activities associated with a given domain, the higher the correlation or ''hit rate'' for that domain. We assume that each positive association increases the overall relationship between that domain and the activity's parent process with the understanding that associations may be complicated by the high degree of connectivity between independently managed systems and personnel [23] . Shown in Figs. 2, 3, 4 , and 5, the levels of associativity between each domain and the NIST SP 800-160 SSE processes are detailed in a series of radar charts with each process' two-letter designator presented in Table 2 [4] . Because the system life cycle processes are organized and grouped into four families, the radar charts are organized as such to provide a similar perspective where In providing this domain-to-process mapping, we create a repeatable and readily tailorable methodology for decision makers and system-level engineers to prioritize their SSE efforts based on protection needs where the radar charts, the processes mappings, and instructions for tailoring these results are made available for use online. These graphs serve as an initial starting point for developers to infer which SSE processes are most valuable for meeting a specific security domain need or concern, given no previous bias of what specific process areas to explore (i.e., we assume that all processes, activities, and tasks were given similar and fair assessment by the authors and reviewers of NIST SP 800-160). Note, these mappings represent a SSE view based on domain definition and scope as well as interpretation. Other domain definitions, scopes, and interpretations will most likely result in different associations. Thus, these graphs (and Table 11 ) do not attempt to provide ''the solution'' but merely an initial baseline for consideration and may require further tailoring by SMEs for the system of interest. Thus, this approach also allows for expected gaps in the investigated frameworks treatment of security (those studied for the security domains and the NIST SP 800-160).
To better understand Figs. 2-5, consider a scenario in which the stakeholder (or project manager) considers Physical and Environmental Security to be the system's highest security concern. From Fig. 2 We can then use Fig. 1 (and Of these 15 processes, the first eight were determined directly by the domain association to the NIST SP 800-160, while the remaining seven were obtained using explicit process relationships identified in Table 10 and shown in the second column of Table 3 (after removing duplicates).
V. APPLICATION EXAMPLES AND IMPLICATIONS
The mapping of the system agonistic domains to the SSE processes via its activities marks an attempt to focus SSE effort on specific issues (or considerations) during system development. For example, the more associated activities a process has for a domain of interest, the higher the chance that the process will outweigh other processes in terms of importance using this methodology. In doing so, this approach provides a tailorable mechanism for the engineer to quickly determine the most important SSE processes (in the context of their particular system) when using the NIST SP 800-160 as a guideline for secure system development. Of important note is that not all of the activities and tasks in a particular process map directly to a given domain, but rather provide a starting point for focusing when developing and maintaining complex systems. Similarly, tasks and activities in ''non-important'' (or remaining) processes should also be considered when time and resources allow because the suggested approach provides a foundation for addressing the issue, rather than an all-encompassing solution.
For example, while the first level processes (those determined using the domain-to-process mappings) determined by domain association should take precedence based on the system's own criticality factors, the related processes (or second level processes) add an additional layer of consideration for developing sustainably secure systems. Moreover, duplicate process listings do not necessarily indicate that those processes are more important or that more resources should be allocated towards those process areas; they are a byproduct of various associations and relations that each process shares with other processes. Further examination and analysis needs to be conducted in order to provide an accurate interpretation of the nature of duplicate processes.
Next, the three examples provided in [2] (conventional IT, government specific acquisition, and critical infrastructure) are extended through the use of the methodologies outlined in Sections III and IV. However, decisions regarding when, where, and how these system agnostic security domains and their interpretations should be used are best determined by the specific industry sectors and SMEs associated with those systems. Thus, these examples are not intended to replace the need for applying sound engineering judgment, established best practices, or risk assessments, but rather function as example use cases for further analysis and consideration for engineering complex systems. In this way, it was possible to construct prioritization schemes that determine, based on what controls matter more for the system or organization, how to organize the overarching SSE level of effort for the system developer.
A. NIST SP 800-53 REVISION 4
The first example is the NIST SP 800-53R4 Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, consisting of 285 controls in 19 families [24] . This publication provides for the ability to scope and tailor controls to an organization's specific mission (or user requirements) and provides best practice recommendations for those responsible for initiating, implementing, or maintaining information security systems. Using the NIST SP 800-53R4 prioritization scheme, the domains list by ''order of importance'' are: Compliance; Physical and Environmental; People and Interconnectivity; Asset Management; and System Resiliency and Operations [2] . Applying the domain-to-process methodology to the Compliance domain, we determine the associated processes from each of the process families, summarized in Table 4 . Table 5 . This, however, does not mean that Compliance is the most important domain. Conversely, it merely identifies that this specific domain reaches across all processes and activities in some manner. This perhaps, confirms the expected breadth (and challenge) of compliance.
While these results may not provide initially actionable information, they do offer substantiation that Compliance plays a role in all SSE activities and must be considered under most, if not all, circumstances. This is particularly important when considering personnel actions as motivation to comply is often based on the users' understanding of why their actions and behaviors can put organizational assets at risk [28] . They also point to an area in the methodology that requires additional research and consideration in order to provide the user more actionable results. 
B. DEFENSE ACQUISITION GUIDEBOOK
This example demonstrates the capability of the proposed framework to prioritize several SSE processes by aggregating multiple security domains. The system security Chapter of the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) (i.e., Program Protection) is examined [25] ; it provides detailed procedural steps in performing criticality analysis, the Department of Defense's (DoD) method by which mission-critical components and information are identified and prioritized. In essence, this program protection based concept seeks to VOLUME 5, 2017 defend warfighting capabilities by keeping secret things from getting out and malicious things from getting in [22] and [25] . The DAG also provides details on integrating systems security with classical Systems Engineering processes for mitigating and managing risks to unprecedented technologies and mission-critical system functionality throughout the acquisition lifecycle [25] .
Using the DAG prioritization scheme from [2] , the domains list by ''order of importance'' are: System Resiliency and Asset Management; Compliance and Interconnectivity; and People, Operations, and Physical and Environmental. Applying the domain-to-process methodology to the System Resiliency and Asset Management domains, we determine the associated processes from each of the families, summarized in Table 6 . Table 7 shows the finalized list of first level processes obtained by using the domainto-process mapping methodology as well as the second level related processes from the associated relationship graph.
In this example, we initially identify 25 of the 30 processes having some consideration based on the prioritization of System Resiliency and Asset Management. Perhaps more realistically, an initial approach could focus directly on the 13 first level processes (left column of Table 7 ) and attempt to address the related processes (right column of Table 7 ) as needed or as time and resources allow. However, further consideration can provide additional insight as to which processes have more importance for the system of interest. For instance, an ''all-encompassing'' approach can aggregate multiple domains to help prioritize the SSE effort. Figs. 12, 13, and 14 provide an aggregated prioritized process list where: Verification, Validation, Risk Management, and Infrastructure Management are highlighted for consideration. This is not to say that these processes are of more importance; rather, these processes have a higher correlation value given our specific association scheme. This example emphasizes that prioritizing multiple domains may initially highlight too many processes to effectively manage, however, by aggregating their associative sums, we can identify which processes appear more consistently across the various domains. Thus, this approach can offer the Systems Security Engineer a more targeted approach for tailoring the SSE processes, activities, and tasks. More concretely, this approach provides a more reasonable starting point by prioritization only four of the processes rather than 13 or 25. 
C. SCADA SECURITY POLICY FRAMEWORK
This example demonstrates the utility of the framework to incorporate SME input into the prioritization schema. The Framework for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Security Policy, developed by Sandia National Laboratories in an effort to ease the creation of SCADA security policies and ensuring coverage over all critical areas of SCADA security as well as flexibility in developing customized policies for specific operations [26] . The domains list by ''order of importance'' for this example are: Asset Management; People, Operations, Physical and Environmental; and finally Compliance, System Resiliency, and Interconnectivity [2] . Applying the suggested methodology to the Asset Management domain results in the process prioritizations given in Table 8 . Thus, 11 of the 30 processes are identified as first level process, providing a reasonable starting point for develop a verifiably secure system with an emphasis on Asset Management security.
While the framework ''solution'' initially suggests focus- ing on 11 first level (and possibly 13 related processes, not shown), this result may be customized by SME input. For example, a SCADA security SME may desire to incorporate additional security domains such as Physical and Environmental, as well as, Operations and People. This customization is easily incorporated into the framework and results in a more comprehensive set of SSE processes shown in Table 9 . However, the SME's desire to include these important security domains results in a large number of required and related SSE processes and activities which hinders prioritization. Using the aggregation approach included in the framework prioritization tool, a 
VI. CONCLUSION
This work proposes a customizable framework to inform the efficient application of SSE effort and specifically the 30 processes, 111 activities, and 428 tasks defined in the recently released NIST SP 800-160. It does so by examining and mapping the SSE processes and activities to a standardized approach, as well as, providing three prioritization examples to address system security issues in complex systems of interest (conventional IT, cyber-physical, and defense).
Cumulatively, these examples demonstrate the utility of the framework for understanding and prioritizing the SSE effort. Note, these examples, and more generally, this framework's current process and activity mapping is not intended to provide ''the solution;'' it merely serves as a baseline for further understanding and tailoring the SSE effort according to Stakeholder's security needs and concerns. Moreover, as NIST SP 800-160 is put into practice further refinement will be necessary.
In future work, we desire to further analyze the domain-to-process mapping and relationship in order to better depict a more accurate correlation between the system agnostic domains and the NIST SP 800-160. Additionally, we hope to apply this methodology and framework to a working system, such as a vehicle or avionics system, in order to test its validity and adjust our framework based on real-world findings. Finally, we would like to provide additional insight into duplicate process listings, as this current effort (save for the second example) treats all processes equally for the purposes of this research activity. Doing so may provide a more detailed approach at domain criticality or process importance for the Systems Engineer and brings us closer to fully understanding an effective systems security approach, increase the manageability of SSE efforts, and provide cost effective SSE solutions.
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